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A Kiss Is Just a Kiss, or Is It?  A Comparative Look at 
Italian and American Sex Crimes 
Alberto Cadoppi ∗ & Michael Vitiello∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the course of recent decades, both American and Italian 
law have made efforts to deal with numerous challenging cases involv-
ing rape and other sexual offenses. In particular, two Italian cases 
emphasize the important issues at play.  In the first, a man kissed a 
young female and was convicted of a violation of Italy’s sexual offense 
statute (roughly akin to rape).1 In the second, the offender’s conduct 
consisted of slapping the victim’s bottom.2  Two aspects of those cases 
are surprising.  First, the cases demonstrate significant advances in 
Italian society in these matters. This is, after all, the country where a 
judge made international headlines just over a decade ago when he 
announced a rule that a man could not possibly rape a woman wear-
ing tight blue jeans.3  Second, the defendants in both cases were 
charged with sexual violence, the Italian offense most similar to rape.
4
 
By contrast, even though American law has responded to many 
feminist concerns about sexual autonomy, one might readily question 
whether such conduct would be prosecuted as sex offenses under 
American law. 
5
  Though these cases might fall under certain state 
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 1 Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 88.  
 2 Cass. pen., sez. III., 23 sept. 2004, n.37395, Riv. Pen. 2004, 1189. 
 3 See Alessandra Stanley, Ruling on Tight Jeans and Rape Sets Off Anger in Italy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1999, at A6.   
 4 See CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 609-bis (Italy).  
 5 In Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 731–32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), the Court of 
Appeals of Indiana held that grabbing was sexual battery, demonstrating that Vitiel-
192 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:191 
laws covering lower classes of sex offenses, neither case would likely 
amount to rape.  Two American cases further demonstrate how much 
Italian law differs from American law in this area.  In the first case, a 
seventeen-year-old boy was videotaped engaging in consensual oral 
sex with a fifteen-year-old girl at a holiday party.6  The second case in-
volves basketball superstar Kobe Bryant and allegations that he raped 
a hotel employee.
7
  Although the Bryant case never went to trial, vari-
ous versions of the facts were widely reported.
8
  As the facts emerged, 
they mirrored those of the kind of case—now more publicly dis-
cussed—in which a woman has not consented to intercourse but the 
man believes that she has. 
This Article, a joint effort between scholars in both Italian and 
American criminal law, contrasts these cases.  Part II develops the 
Italian cases, including their disposition in Italy.  In Part III, Vitiello 
discusses how American courts would resolve these cases.  In Part IV, 
Vitiello discusses normative concerns and, especially in light of Amer-
ica’s heightened punishments for sexual offenders, questions wheth-
er American jurisdictions should treat these as sexual offenses.  Part V 
develops the two American cases.  In Part VI, Cadoppi explores how 
Italian law would resolve the two American cases.  Finally, in Part VII, 
Cadoppi asks the normative question: do the Americans or the Ital-
ians have the better view? 
II. IS A KISS JUST A KISS? 
A. Italian Criminal Case Number 19808 9 
In 1994 in Sanremo, Italy, an assistant chief of the state police 
commanded his colleague to meet him at an isolated beach at night.
10
  
The accused, “G.G.,” shut off the engine of his service vehicle and at-
tempted to kiss his colleague, “R.C.”11  She resisted and placed her 
hand over his mouth in order to stop him.
12
  He then commanded 
 
lo’s intuitive response was wrong.  Contra Scott-Gordon v. State, 579 N.E.2d 602, 604 
(Ind. 1991) (grab of the buttocks was not alone sufficient to meet the force element 
of the statute). 
 6 Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
 7 See infra notes 268–271 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 272–276 and accompanying text. 
 9 Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 88. 
 10 Id. at 88. 
 11 Id. at 89. 
 12 Id.  
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her to drive to a place with a panoramic view, where he grabbed her 
and kissed her neck.
13
  Again, she objected.
14
 
G.G. was charged with violating article 609-bis of the Italian Pen-
al Code.
15
  Prior to 1996, rape was a crime against public morality, not 
a crime against the person.
16
  Like changes in rape law elsewhere, ar-
ticle 609-bis was a victory for feminists and raised public awareness 
about violence towards women.
17
  The law is now unequivocally a 
crime against the person.  Unlike traditional rape laws, article 609-bis 
does not require penetration.
18
  Instead, the offense is committed 
whenever a person “with violence or threat or by means of abuse of 
authority, forces someone to perform or undergo sexual acts.”19  
Convicted in 2000 and sentenced to sixteen months in prison, G.G. 
appealed his conviction.
20
  He contended, in part, that the evidence 
was insufficient because his acts were mere “advances” and that R.C.’s 
autonomy was not impaired.
21
 
On appeal, the court focused on how to interpret the “sexual 
acts” language of the article.  The interpretation was broad and in-
cluded any conduct involving carnal touching.
22
  More specifically, a 
sexual act can include anything that results in bodily contact between 
an actor and his passive subject, even if fleeting and not otherwise 
endangering the subject’s sexual self-determination.23  Thus, article 
609-bis encompasses not just acts involving the genitals, but includes 
those involving any erogenous areas.  A court may determine what an 
erogenous zone is by reference to medical, psychological, and socio-
logical-anthropological sciences.
24
  Although such an interpretation 
means that a person from a culture whose members routinely kiss 
upon meeting may not be guilty of the offense, the facts before the 
court clearly indicated that G.G. was performing a sexually aggressive 
act. 
 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id.   
 15 Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 88. 
 16 C.P. art. 519. 
 17 For an analysis of the Italian law, see generally Alberto Cadoppi, Commento art. 
609-bis C.P., in COMMENTARIO DELLE NORME CONTRO LA VIOLENZA SESSUALE E CONTRO LA 
PEDOFILIA 439 (Alberto Cadoppi ed., 4th ed. 2006).   
 18 C.P. art. 609-bis. 
 19 Id.  
 20 Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 88. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. at 89. 
 23 Id.   
 24 Id. 
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Further, the court found the necessary “violence” required in ar-
ticle 609-bis.
25
  According to some criminal literature, surprise alone 
would not be enough to satisfy the elements of the offense; however, 
the Supreme Court disagreed.
26
  The court held that the necessary vi-
olence element may be satisfied in situations where the actor puts the 
victim in a position where she cannot resist.
27
  Furthermore, the court 
found that the element is also met when the rapid completion of the 
criminal action combines with an act that overcomes her will.
28
  Thus, 
the court concluded that G.G. did more than kiss R.C. suddenly, an 
act that would have merely surprised her.  Surprise, alone, would not 
divide a simple kiss from a prohibited act of sexual violence.  G.G. did 
more than merely kiss; after she placed her hand over his mouth, he 
continued to force himself upon her.
29
 
B. Italian Criminal Case Number 3739530 
The second noteworthy case involved the sexually inappropriate 
conduct of “A.M.,” a magistrate of the Court of Cassation in Rome.31  
A.M. was charged with various violations of article 609-bis involving 
different women.
32
  But the gravamen of his offenses was the “lustful 
touching of the buttocks.”33  While that was his sexual act, he engaged 
in other behavior that made the sexuality of the touching explicit.
34
  
A.M. was convicted of various offenses, resulting in a maximum term 
of imprisonment.
35
 
Among his arguments on appeal, A.M. contended that the term 
“sexual act” in article 609-bis could not include his conduct and that 
the statutory element instead required “carnal conjunction” and “vio-
lent acts of lust.” 36  Further, he contended that the definition of the 
statutory element, “sexual act,” is not agreed upon in common usage 
 
 25 Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 89. 
 26 Id.; see also Giuliano Balbi, Violenza sessuale, in VII ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA 9, 
(1999); Stefania Tabarelli De Fatis, Sulla rilevanza penale del bacio come atto di libidine 
prima e dopo la riforma dei reati sessuali, 1997 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA 
PENALE 975. 
 27 Id.  
 28 Id.  
 29 Id.   
 30 Cass. pen., sez. III, 23 sept. 2004, n.37395, Riv. Pen. 2004, 1189. 
 31 Id. at 1189.  
 32 Id. at 1191. 
 33 Id. at 1189. 
 34 Id. at 1195. 
 35 Id. at 1189. 
 36 Cass. pen., sez. III, 23 sept. 2004, n.37395, Riv. Pen. 2004, 1189, 1190. 
2010] A KISS IS JUST A KISS, OR IS IT? 195 
or in scientific literature and that his conviction therefore violated 
constitutional principles of definiteness.
37
 
Rejecting the first argument, the court looked at the change in 
the law, which featured an intentional emphasis on the sexual auton-
omy of the victim.
38
  Thus, sexual acts may involve constraining a pas-
sive victim through violence, threat, or abuse of authority.
39
  But more 
relevant to the case before the court, a sexual act may be any act that 
results in physical contact between the actor and the passive subject 
that involves the subject’s sexuality and is likely to endanger the sub-
ject’s self-determination.40 
Next, the court broadly defined “sexual.”  Not limited to an act 
involving the genitals of the actor and victim, “sexual” includes 
touching those areas that medical science deems erogenous.
41
  This 
interpretation is consistent, in the court’s view, with the underlying 
shift in policy in the 1996 statute.
42
  Therefore, the court reached its 
conclusion despite the fact that acts involving the parties’ genitals are 
almost always sexual while other acts, such as a slap on the buttocks, 
may not always be sexual in nature.  Instead, the court determined 
that the sexual nature of an act must be assessed in its overall context.  
Viewed in that light, the court found A.M.’s conduct to be “sexual” in 
nature. 
Similar to the American constitutional doctrine of “vagueness,” 
Article 25 of the Italian Constitution requires that a law be drawn suf-
ficiently precisely to allow citizens to be able to determine the line be-
tween legal and illegal conduct.43  Thus, A.M. argued that lumping 
rape and sexual violence in one generic term, “sexual acts,” lacked 
sufficient definiteness.
44
  That breadth leaves the interpretation of 
prohibited conduct to the judge’s discretion. 
The court rejected A.M.’s arguments.45  The court considered 
the legislature’s decision to make article 609-bis a crime against per-
sonal freedom rather than a crime against public morality,  then con-
cluded that the legislature’s intent was to protect against acts impair-
 
 37 Id.  
 38 Id. at 1190. 
 39 Id.  
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 1192. 
 42 Cass. pen., sez. III, 23 sept. 2004, n.37395, Riv. Pen. 2004, 1189, 1192. 
 43 Id. at 1191. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 1191–92. 
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ing a person’s self-determination.46  This legislative decision provided 
courts guidance on how to interpret the phrase “sexual act”; that is, 
the court should make punishable acts that violate the freedom of 
sexual self-determination.  Requiring greater specificity would run 
the risk of allowing offenders to avoid prosecution for conduct ero-
sive of self-determination.  Further, the Constitutional Court has of-
ten upheld legislation where the legislature has used phrases with 
commonly understood meanings.47  Language may be sufficiently 
precise by reference to non-legal concepts.  As a result, the term 
“sexual act” becomes sufficiently precise to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny.
48
 
III. HOW WOULD AN AMERICAN COURT TREAT THE CONDUCT OF  
G.G. AND A.M.? 
To answer the question posed above, some consideration must 
be given to variations in state law.  This Article will consider New Jer-
sey, Alabama, Indiana, and California, so as to canvass one jurisdic-
tion each from the east coast, south, midwest and west coast.  As de-
veloped in this Part, while G.G.’s conduct could be sexual battery, no 
reported case involving similar conduct in those jurisdictions could 
be located,49 other than one case in Indiana where an offender was 
convicted of sexual battery for slapping a woman’s buttocks.50  None-
theless, such cases appear to be extremely rare.  A cursory glance at 
case law in other states
51
 suggests a dearth of prosecutions for similar 
conduct, with one notable exception.  That exception involves adult 
offenders who have sexual contact with minors.
52
 
 
 46 Id. at 1192. 
 47 See id. at 1192. 
 48 See id. 
 49 See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 50 See Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).  
 51 I examined leading treatises and Criminal Law case books on the assumption 
that those texts would include the unusual case.  That review did not reveal any cases 
similar to G.G.  See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 
(4th ed. 2007); J DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW  (5th ed. 2009) [hereinaf-
ter DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW]; WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (4th 
ed. 2003); SANFORD H. KADISH, STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER & CAROL S. STEIKER, CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS, (8th ed. 2007);JOHN KAPLAN, ROBERT 
WEISBERG & GUYORA BINDER, CRIMINAL LAW:  CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2008).  
 52 See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 174 P.3d 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d in part, 217 
P.3d 659 (Or. 2009). 
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Unlike Italian law, American jurisdictions typically divide sex 
crimes into distinct offenses.
53
  Article 609-bis, by contrast, conflates 
any sexual assault with rape.
54
  Modern American jurisdictions single 
out rape as the most serious sexual offense, but now have a variety of 
sexual offenses.
55
 
A. The Development of American Sexual Assault Law 
A brief detour may help clarify the contours of American rape 
law.  Prior to the mid-twentieth century, most jurisdictions grouped a 
variety of “rape” crimes together.56  That is, rape occurred when the 
male forced intercourse, when the female was under a specified age, 
when the victim was mentally incapable of giving consent, when the 
female was unconscious, or when the male misled the female into be-
lieving that he was her husband.
57
  Judges might be given wide lati-
tude on the appropriate sentence; for example, California allowed 
the judge to sentence the offender to a term of anywhere from three 
years to life in prison.
58
 
By the mid-twentieth century, some jurisdictions abandoned the 
single-category approach to rape.
59
  A jurisdiction might, for example, 
have defined aggravated rape as where the female resisted to the ut-
most and her resistance was overcome by force or where the victim 
was quite young, while other forms of rape were considered simple 
rape.60  Penalties for the two forms differed considerably, with aggra-
vated rape often exposing the offender to the death penalty.
61
  Some 
states subdivided the crime even further.
62
  For example, New York 
created a classification of misdemeanor rape that applies when the 
 
 53 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 243.4 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8 
(West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 2005). 
 54 C.P. art. 609. 
 55 See infra notes 94–108 and accompanying text. 
 56 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.1 cmt. 1 (1980). 
 57 Id.  
 58 Id.  
 59 Id.  
 60 Id. 
 61 Id.; Raymond T. Bye, Recent History and Present Status of Capital Punishment in the 
United States, 17 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 234, 241–42 (1926) (noting that in 1925, 
18 states and the federal government authorized capital punishment for the rape of 
an adult female). 
 62 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.1 cmt. 1. 
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female is under the age of consent and the male is under twenty-one 
years old.
63
 
American jurisdictions typically enumerated other sexual of-
fenses, including sodomy.
64
  The pattern regarding sodomy laws 
around the country varied a bit more than did ordinary rape law.
65
  
Additionally, provisions outlawing “crimes against nature” often in-
cluded both consensual and non-consensual behavior and both ho-
mosexual and heterosexual conduct.
66
  Despite a marital exemption 
from rape laws, some jurisdictions criminalized oral and anal copula-
tion even between spouses.
67
 
While state law prohibited a wide variety of sexual behavior, sex-
ual touching that did not involve penetration was not criminalized as 
a sexual crime, with limited exceptions such as cunnilingus.
68
  Most 
crimes required at least penetration with the penis.
69
  Sexual battery 
did not exist, except for assault with intent to rape or to commit sod-
omy.
70
  Instead, exotic touching might have been treated as an as-
sault, but jurisdictions did not have a distinct sexual assault offense.
71
 
By the end of the twentieth century, a good deal had changed.
72
  
Two major factors explain the changes in American law governing 
substantive sexual offenses.  The first factor in the development of 
American criminal law was the publication of the Model Penal Code.73  
The second and more important factor was the influence of the 
women’s rights movement on sexual offender laws.74 
Some commentators are critical of the Model Penal Code’s ap-
proach to sex crimes.
75
  Indeed, one commentator has argued that 
the Code’s provisions “should be pulled and replaced.”76  For exam-
 
 63 Id.  
 64 Id. § 213.2 cmt. 1.  
 65 See, e.g., id. § 213.2 cmt. 1 n.5. 
 66 Id. § 213.2 cmt. 1. 
 67 Id.  
 68 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES §§ 213.2, 213.4 cmt. 1. 
 69 Id. § 213.4 cmt. 1. 
 70 Id. § 213.4 n.80. 
 71 Id.  
 72 LAFAVE, supra note 51, at 847–50 (4th ed. 2003) (contrasting the traditional 
and modern approaches to rape). 
 73 See discussion infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text. 
 74 See discussion infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 75 See, e.g., Deborah W. Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offender Provisions 
Should Be Pulled and Replaced, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2003). 
 76 Id. at 207. 
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ple, it left in place the marital exemption from rape.
77
  The Code also 
reduced the degree of the felony under certain circumstances, such 
as when the woman was a “voluntary social companion” who had pre-
viously allowed the man “sexual liberties.”78  For some offenses, the 
Code made the woman’s prior promiscuity an affirmative defense.79  
Further, it kept in place a requirement that the victim make a prompt 
complaint.
80
  Finally, it provided that no one may be convicted of a 
felony under the sexual offenses provision unless the victim’s testi-
mony is corroborated.
81
 
Despite these shortcomings, the Model Penal Code recognized a 
distinct offense of sexual assault.
82
  The gravamen of the offense was 
“sexual contact” with another when the perpetrator knows that the 
contact was offensive to the other person (or, which occurred in a va-
riety of settings, such as where the perpetrator knows that his victim is 
unaware of the sexual act or the victim is under a certain age).
83
  The 
Code defines “sexual contact” in terms of its purpose to arouse or 
gratify sexual desire.
84
  The Code was quite modern in its recognition 
that traditional assault was inadequate to protect the distinct interest 
at stake when the touching was sexual in nature.  The offense is de-
signed to protect against “an invasion of individual dignity.”85  As the 
comments indicate, this provision of the Code has been influential, 
with many states adopting a sexual offense distinct from traditional 
assault.
86
 
The more important influence on substantive sex offenses was 
the women’s rights movement.  Significant reforms began during the 
1970s.
87
  As I have summarized elsewhere,  
Those reforms include the elimination of the spousal immunity in 
many jurisdictions, the elimination of special cautionary instruc-
tions and the corroboration requirement, and the elimination of 
the requirement of resistance or, at least, the elimination of the 
 
 77 See id. at 213. 
 78 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.1 cmt. 2 (1980). 
 79 Id. § 213.6(3). 
 80 Id. § 213.6(4). 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. § 213.4. 
 83 Id.  
 84 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.4 cmt. 2. 
 85 Id. § 213.4 cmt. 1. 
 86 Id.  
 87 Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 ARIZ. 
ST. L. J. 651, 657 (2008). 
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requirement of resistance to the utmost.  Further, . . . in some in-
stances reforms expanded the conduct that is criminal and li-
mited the mens rea requirements for rape.  Those reforms were 
sometimes the product of legislative enactment or judicial inter-
pretation of existing rape law.
88
 
Those reforms reflect a major rethinking about the nature of 
sexual offenses. 
No longer is rape conceived of as a crime of violence.  Instead, it 
is an invasion of a woman’s “inner space,” of her privacy and her au-
tonomy.
89
  Whereas sex offenses arose in an era that discouraged sex-
ual autonomy outside marriage, modern sex law values and protects 
it.
90
  While debate continues as to whether reforms have gone far 
enough,
91
 one can find numerous cases prosecuted today that would 
have gone without a remedy as recently as thirty years ago.
92
  In some 
instances, prosecutors would have refused to prosecute, but in many 
other instances, the legal requirements made prosecution impossible. 
Once the law recognizes the importance of sexual autonomy, 
adoption of a sexual assault statute is a logical gap-filling extension of 
the law.  For example, a statute might provide for a lesser-included 
offense for situations where a jury might not want to convict a defen-
dant of rape, such as perhaps in a case of date rape.  Further, a sexual 
assault statute serves to distinguish sexual assault from, for example, a 
fight between two men.  Instead, the crime focuses on the sexual na-
ture of the touching and underscores that certain kinds of touching 
are of a different order from a punch in the nose.  Sexual groping of-
fends one’s dignity and sense of selfhood, even if not necessarily 
one’s physical safety.93 
 
 88 Id. 
 89 DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 51, at § 33.03[2] . 
 90 Id.; see also Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998). 
 91 See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION 
AND THE FAILURE OF LAW ix, 10 (1998).  Part of the problem is cultural and not legal.  
Even when the criminal law has expanded to allow the conviction of an actor, 
“[s]ocial attitudes are tenacious, and they can easily nullify the theories and doc-
trines found in the law books.”  Id. at 17; see also Joshua Dressler, Where We Have Been, 
and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 409, 410 (1998) (“[F]eminists can take legitimate pride in the fact that 
rape law has undergone significant reform in just the past decade or two, largely as a 
result of their efforts.”). 
 92 See Vitiello, supra note 87, at 651–52 (describing some of the changes in the law 
that have made prosecution for rape more likely today both substantively and practi-
cally). 
 93 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 (1980) (defining any sexual contact as “any 
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for the purpose of arous-
ing or gratifying sexual desire”). 
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B. State Sexual Assault Law Today and How It Would Apply to G.G. 
and A.M. 
Most modern jurisdictions have adopted some form of sexual as-
sault statute, including all of the jurisdictions examined for this Ar-
ticle.94  For example, Alabama’s code includes a sexual abuse statute, 
criminalizing the act of subjecting another person to sexual conduct 
by forcible compulsion.
95
  The statute defines “sexual conduct” as any 
touching done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of ei-
ther party.
96
  The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted 
the statute to include touching of intimate parts of the body, which is 
interpreted to mean any part of the body that a reasonable person 
would consider “private.”97 
Indiana’s sexual battery statute contains a provision similar to 
Alabama’s law.  It punishes “a person, who with intent to arouse or 
satisfy the person’s own sexual desires or the sexual desires of anoth-
er person, touches another person when that person is . . . compelled 
to submit to the touching by force or the imminent threat of force.”98 
New Jersey has a similar named offense of sexual assault, but it is 
implicated when an actor commits an act of sexual contact with a vic-
tim “less than 13 years old and the actor is at least four years older 
than the victim.”99  The New Jersey statute also includes a lesser of-
fense of criminal sexual contact.
100
  It occurs when one commits “an 
act of sexual contact with the victim” under various circumstances, 
including those in which the actor uses physical force or coercion, 
but the victim does not sustain severe injuries.
101
  Sexual contact is de-
fined broadly to include “an intentional touching by the victim or ac-
tor, either directly or through the clothing, of the victim’s or actor’s 
intimate parts for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim 
or sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor.”102  The law de-
 
 94 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 243.4 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8 
(West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §2 C:14-2 (West 2005). 
 95 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.). 
 96 Id. § 13A-6-60(3). 
 97 Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1036, 1038–39 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981). 
 98 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8(a)(1).  
 99 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(b). 
 100 Id. § 2C:14-3. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. § 2C:14-1(d). 
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fines “intimate parts” as including the “sexual organs, genital areas, 
anal area, inner thigh, groin, buttock or breast of a person.”103 
California includes a misdemeanor sexual battery offense that 
appears broader than the laws of Alabama, Indiana, and New Jersey.
104
  
In California, misdemeanor sexual battery is committed when a per-
son “touches an intimate part” of another person and the touching is 
“against the will of the person touched, and is for the specific pur-
pose of sexual arousal, sexual gratification, or sexual abuse.”105  Cali-
fornia defines “intimate part” as the sex organs, anus, groin, or but-
tocks of any person, and the breast of a female.
106
  Further, the 
touching may be direct or through the clothing of either party.
107
  Un-
like the other states canvassed, California does not require forcible 
compulsion.
108
  This distinction is extremely important in situations 
where, for example, an offender grabs his victim without any inde-
pendent threat or forcible act beyond the sexual touching itself. 
Courts in Indiana have faced the question of what constitutes 
forcible compulsion.  In 1991, the Indiana Supreme Court found in-
sufficient evidence of force in a case in which the defendant grabbed 
a co-worker’s buttocks and announced that he had received a “free 
feel.”109  In finding the evidence insufficient to support the conviction 
for touching by force, the court observed that not all unwanted 
touching constitutes touching by force.
110
 
More recently, an Indiana appellate court distinguished Scott-
Gordon.111  In Bailey v. State,
112
 the court upheld the offender’s convic-
tion.  The court focused on additional facts that it found relevant: 
Bailey had previously asked if he could come home with her and 
“pull down her pants,”113 and the victim previously witnessed Bailey 
masturbating in a park.
114
  Additionally, the victim had made clear to 
 
 103 Id. § 2C:14-1(e). 
 104 CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).  
 105 Id. § 243.4(e)(1). 
 106 Id. § 243.4(g)(1). 
 107 Id. § 243.4(e)(2). 
 108 Compare id. § 243.4 with ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009 
Sess.) and IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8 (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.). 
 109 Scott-Gordon v. State, 579 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. 1991). 
 110 Id.  
 111 Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 730–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 112 Id. at 729. 
 113 Id.  
 114 Id. at 730. 
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Bailey that she wanted him to leave her alone.
115
  That sufficed to 
show that Bailey forced his victim to submit to his touching.
116
  While 
the court did not explicitly frame it this way, the opinion suggested 
that as long as the defendant is on notice that his advances are un-
welcome, subsequent contact will satisfy the force element. 
The court went further, holding in the alternative that imminent 
threat of force element was met because sexual battery should be 
judged from the perspective of the victim when a fact finder is “de-
termining whether the presence or absence of forceful compulsion 
existed.”117  Judged from this perspective, the court found that the vic-
tim had a reason to fear Bailey.
118
 
Bailey’s gross misconduct notwithstanding, the appellate court’s 
decision is open to criticism, as the dissent points out.
119
  The dissent 
summed up the most obvious problem with the majority’s approach 
as follows: 
[B]ailey simply ran from behind Adams and grabbed or touched 
her on the buttocks.  The record is void of any evidence that 
Adams was even aware of Bailey’s approaching her from behind 
before the touching occurred, let alone that she was compelled or 
forced by Bailey to submit to the touching.
120
 
Other courts have faced a similar interpretive problem in a 
closely related context.  Both the New Jersey
121
 and California
122
 Su-
preme Courts have had to resolve whether an offender commits rape 
or, in New Jersey, “forcible sexual assault,” which requires “an act of 
sexual penetration,”123 when the only act of force is the force inherent 
in the act of intercourse itself.  In a widely reported case, a unanim-
ous New Jersey Supreme Court effectively read “force” out of its sta-
tute.
124
  In M.T.S., a seventeen-year-old boy engaged in heavy petting 
with a fifteen-year-old girl, resulting in an act of penetration to which 
the girl did not consent.
125
  The juvenile court found the boy guilty of 
forcible sexual assault despite the absence of any force beyond that 
 
 115 Id. at 729–30. 
 116 Id. at 731. 
 117 Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 731. 
 118 Id. at 732. 
 119 See id. at 732–33 (Darden, J., dissenting).  
 120 Id. at 733. 
 121 See State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1269–70 (N.J. 1992). 
 122 See People v. Griffin, 94 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Cal. 2004). 
 123 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(c)(1) (West 2005). 
 124 See M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277. 
 125 See id. at 1267–68. 
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inherent in the act of intercourse itself.
126
  Notwithstanding the inclu-
sion of a force element and the absence of a consent element in the 
statute, the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the necessary force 
is met whenever a person achieves penetration in the absence of af-
firmative and freely-given permission.127  California did not go as far 
as New Jersey in reducing the force element and conflating it with 
consent.  But in rape cases, the California Supreme Court has held 
that nothing in the term “force” suggests that the necessary force for 
rape must be “substantially different from or substantially greater than” 
the force normally inherent in sexual intercourse.
128
 
While both of these cases involved penetration as opposed to the 
other sexual touching present in the two Italian cases discussed 
above, they remain informative and relevant.  They may lend some 
guidance on how a court would interpret the force element in sexual 
battery cases where the sexual battery includes sexual touching with-
out penetration.  Prior to the late twentieth century and the adoption 
of sexual assault offenses, it is doubtful that American law would have 
been broad enough to cover the kind of conduct in the two Italian 
cases.129 
That said, modern sexual assault statutes appear broad enough 
to include A.M.’s slap on the buttocks as a prohibited act of sexual as-
sault.  Such an act seems like the kind of invasion of one’s privacy 
and individual dignity that the Model Penal Code targeted in its sexual 
assault offense.
130
  This kind of touching comes within the definition 
of sexual contact set out in all four of the statutes canvassed above.
131
  
For example, under Alabama law, a slap on the buttocks would con-
stitute “sexual conduct,” or touching “done for the purpose of grati-
fying the sexual desire of either party.”132  Almost certainly, the touch-
ing of the buttocks would come within the Alabama Court of 
Criminal Appeals’s holding that the statute includes the touching of 
 
 126 See id. at 1269. 
 127 Id. at 1277.  
 128 People v. Griffin, 94 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Cal. 2004). 
 129 A question posted on the Criminal Law professors’ listserv, asking whether an-
yone was aware of a case like that of G.G. or A.M., produced no similar cases with the 
exception of one instance discussed below (involving a juvenile victim).  See infra 
notes 156–177 and accompanying text. 
 130 See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 213.4 cmt. 1 (1980). 
 131 See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(3) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 243.4(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8 
(West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(d) (West 
2005).  
 132 See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-60(3).  
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any part of the body that a reasonable person would consider “pri-
vate.”133  The other statutes reviewed above also cover this situation.  
The touching of intimate body parts is included in both the Califor-
nia and New Jersey statutes.
134
  Further, both of them include some 
reference to sexual gratification; that is, the touching is sexually dri-
ven and not, for example, a congratulatory pat on the buttocks com-
mon among coaches and athletes.
135
  The element of sexual gratifica-
tion would be proven, as in A.M.’s case, by the specific context in 
which the touching took place. 
It is more difficult to ascertain whether the required element of 
force would be met under Alabama, Indiana, and New Jersey law.  
California’s law seems most obviously met: it requires only that the 
touching be against the will of the person touched,
136
 a fact that can 
be inferred from context as well as from the victim’s testimony.  The 
California law also includes the buttocks within its definition of the 
“intimate part” of the other person’s body.137  As the Scott-Gordon and 
Bailey cases demonstrate, Indiana law requires something more than a 
mere grabbing of the buttocks.  In addition to the lack of consent, 
the state must also show some element of force or threat of force.  
The Bailey court found the threat of force element satisfied by past 
acts generating fear in the victim and by conduct judged from the vic-
tim’s perspective,138 but the dissent highlighted difficulties with this 
approach.
139
  Similarly, a court in Alabama would have to determine 
whether the offense requires any force in addition to the sexual act 
itself.  Absent a prosecution for the kind of conduct involved in 
A.M.’s case, one can only speculate how the New Jersey courts would 
resolve the question. 
The case law is limited in this area.  As Bailey and M.T.S. demon-
strate (or in the case of M.T.S., at least in the context of a crime simi-
lar to rape), some courts have been willing to read force expansively.  
But both Bailey and M.T.S. are open to criticism on statutory con-
struction grounds.
140
  Their broad reading of statutory elements to 
 
 133 See Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1036, 1039 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981).  
 134 CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e)(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(d).  
 135 MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 cmt. 2 (1980). 
 136 CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e)(1).  
 137 Id. § 243.4(g)(1). 
 138 Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 731–32 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 139 Id. at 732–33 (Darden, J., dissenting). 
 140 After all, the New Jersey legislature avoided using the term consent and instead 
used the element of force as the gravamen of the offense.  See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-
2(c) (West 2005).  The court’s interpretation turned this upside down.  See State ex rel 
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protect the underlying policy of the statute might lead a court to re-
solve any uncertainty against the offender in a case like A.M.’s, espe-
cially in light of his prior history of inappropriate sexual behavior.  
No doubt, the relative employment status of A.M. and his victims 
might also be deemed relevant to the force inherent in the situa-
tion.
141
 
G.G.’s case presents a more questionable situation.  An un-
wanted kiss would not appear to qualify as a sufficient touching under 
California or New Jersey law.  The California statute requires the of-
fender to touch “an intimate part” of another person.142  But Califor-
nia defines this term as including “the sexual organ, anus, groin, or 
buttocks of any person, and the breast of a female.”143  California’s 
failure to mention the lips or neck as an intimate part of the body 
would seem sufficient to prevent GG from qualifying under the law.  
Similar restrictions appear in New Jersey’s statute.144 
Less clear is whether a kiss might be a sufficient touching under 
Alabama and Indiana law.  As indicated above, in Alabama, a sex of-
fense is committed when a person “subjects another person to sexual 
conduct by forcible compulsion.”145  The statute defines “sexual con-
duct” as requiring touching for the purpose of “gratifying the sexual 
desire of either party.”146  The Alabama appellate court has defined 
“intimate parts” as “any part of the body which a reasonable person 
would consider private.”147  One might argue that the lips are an in-
timate part of the body, but reported cases in Alabama interpreting 
the “intimate parts” language have not involved cases where the con-
duct was as limited as kissing.  For example, in one reported case, the 
defendant touched a fully clothed woman on her breastbone in a 
public place.
148
  In another case, while pressing his knees on the 
woman’s knees to pin her down, the defendant reached under the 
 
M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1276–77 (N.J. 1992); see also Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 733 (Dar-
den, J., dissenting) (suggesting the difficulty with the majority’s interpretation of the 
element of force). 
 141 Cf. Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 733 (Darden, J., dissenting) (discussing the relevance 
of an employer-employee relationship in a finding of force or threat of force). 
 142 CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.). 
 143 Id. § 243.4(g)(1). 
 144 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(d)–(e). 
 145 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.).   
 146 Id. § 13A-6-60(3). 
 147 See, e.g., Hutcherson v. State, 441 So. 2d 1048, 1052 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) 
(quoting Parker v. State, 406 So. 2d 1036, 1039 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981)). 
 148 Hutcherson, 441 So. 2d at 1049. 
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victim’s dress and touched her thighs and stomach.149  Obviously, a 
kiss can certainly be intended as an attempt to gratify one’s sexual 
desire or to arouse it in the other person, but research uncovered no 
reported cases where Alabama courts had to resolve the question. 
Indiana law presents the same legal issues as Alabama law.  Its 
sexual battery offense, described above, requires a touching done 
with an “intent to arouse or satisfy the person’s own sexual desires or 
the sexual desires of another person.”150  As with the Alabama statute, 
in a case involving a kiss, a court would have to decide whether the 
kiss was done with the requisite intent to arouse. 
A harder question would be whether a kiss constitutes sufficient 
force to satisfy the elements of sexual battery.  Here, the inquiry 
above arises again.  Whether a simple kiss, even an unexpected kiss, 
can be considered forcible raises the question of whether something 
more than the force inherent in the sexual act is required for a find-
ing of force.  In cases like Bailey and M.T.S., courts have found that 
no other force is necessary.151  For example, in M.T.S., the court 
found that the defendant was guilty of rape based on the force neces-
sary for the act of intercourse, but stipulated that the holding applies 
only when a reasonable person would be on notice that he lacked the 
other person’s consent.152  This may not be present in a case of a sim-
ple kiss.  In Bailey, the two-judge majority found that the necessary 
force or threat of force was present because of a prior history be-
tween the victim and the defendant, which gave the victim a reason to 
fear the defendant on the particular occasion of his unwanted touch-
ing.
153
 
G.G.’s case involved somewhat more force than that involved in 
a kiss. In resisting the defendant’s kiss, the victim pulled away from 
him and placed her hand over his mouth. 
154
  After that, he again 
grabbed the victim and kissed her neck.
155
  Under both Alabama and 
Indiana law, a court faced with the facts of G.G.’s case would have to 
determine whether the defendant’s act of continuing to attempt to 
kiss the victim after she placed her hand over his mouth and signaled 
her disapproval constituted sufficient force under the law.  In what-
 
 149 Parker, 406 So. 2d at 1038. 
 150 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8 (West, Westlaw through 2009 1st Spec. Sess.). 
 151 See Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 732 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); State ex rel M.T.S., 
609 A.2d 1266, 1278–79 (N.J. 1992).   
 152 M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277. 
 153 Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 732. 
 154 Cass. pen., sez. III, 26 jan. 2006, n.19808, Guida al Diritto, n. 37, 2006, 89. 
 155 Id.   
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ever manner the courts were to resolve the issue, it would be harder 
for the defendant to argue that he did not use force as compared to a 
case in which his only act was an initial unwanted kiss. 
Research did not reveal a case in any of the four jurisdictions 
surveyed where the state brought a prosecution based solely on a kiss.  
The closest case, located through a posting on a Criminal Law profes-
sor listserv, was from Oregon.156  State v. Rodriguez
157
 involved a female 
defendant convicted of first degree sexual abuse,
158
 an offense calling 
for a mandatory minimum punishment of seventy-five months in 
prison.
159
  Rodriguez worked with at-risk youths.
160
  She was twenty-
four years old when she began working at the facility where she met 
the twelve-year-old victim.
161
  She became closely involved in the life of 
the victim and his family.
162
  Rumors circulated about the close rela-
tionship between the victim and defendant.
163
  They frequently 
hugged and the defendant often put her arm around the boy when 
they walked together.
164
  She allowed him to sit on her lap and he of-
ten kissed her on the cheek.
165
  E-mails they exchanged confessed 
their love for one another.
166
  Further, they took trips together, in-
cluding two overnight trips.
167
  They were also frequently alone to-
gether, including in the defendant’s apartment.168 
In the absence of any evidence of intercourse, the sexual abuse 
charge was based on a single brief encounter between the two partic-
 
 156 See State v. Rodriguez, 174 P.3d 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d in part 217 P.3d 
659 (Or. 2009).  My thanks to Ohio State Law Professor Doug Berman for bringing 
my attention to this case and for his extremely helpful blog, Sentencing Law and Pol-
icy.  See generally Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/ (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2010). 
 157 Rodriguez, 174 P.3d at 1101. 
 158 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.427(1)(a)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.). 
 159 Id. § 137.700(2)(a)(P).  The severe punishment was part of a ballot measure 
approved by Oregon voters.  State v. Skelton, 957 P.2d 585, 590 n.6 (Or. Ct. App. 
1998).  As many scholars have written, ballot measures are a poor way to determine 
criminal sentences.  See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND 
DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA passim (2001). 
 160 Rodriguez, 174 P.3d at 1101. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Rodriguez, 174 P.3d at 1101.  
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
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ipants.
169
  The act of first degree sexual abuse consisted of the follow-
ing conduct, lasting approximately one minute: 
On February 14, 2005, a staff member named Villalobos saw de-
fendant and the victim in the game room at the club.  There were 
approximately 30 to 50 youths and at least one other staff mem-
ber in the room.  The victim, who had since turned 13, was sitting 
on a chair.  Defendant, who had since turned 25, was standing 
behind him, caressing his face and pulling his head back; the 
back of his head was pressed against her breasts.  Villalobos 
crossed the room and pointed defendant and the victim out to 
Malunay, another staff member, who had his back to them.  Ma-
lunay turned and saw defendant run her hands along the victim’s 
face and through his hair while the back of his head was against 
her breasts.
170
 
The jury had to find that the defendant’s conduct amounted to 
sexual contact, defined as “any touching of the sexual or other inti-
mate parts . . . for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual de-
sire of either party.”171  Despite the limited amount of time involved 
in the encounter, the defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence of sexual contact.
172
  Instead, the issue in the trial court, 
which found in her favor, and in the Oregon appellate court, was 
whether the mandatory minimum sentence of seventy-five months 
was cruel and unusual because it was disproportionate.
173
  The appel-
late court reversed the trial court and found that the sentence would 
not “shock the moral sense of all reasonable people as to what is right 
and proper under the circumstances.”174 
Not only did the court have before it the absence of a claim of 
sufficiency of the evidence, but it also did not think that the issue was, 
when viewed in the abstract, that the defendant’s conduct was so mi-
nor that the sentence would have been excessive.
175
  Instead, the court 
focused on all of the circumstances, including the nature of the rela-
tionship between the defendant and victim (the victim, a young at-
risk child, and the defendant, an adult in a position of trust and re-
 
 169 Id. at 1101–02. 
 170 Id. 
 171 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.305(6) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.). 
 172 Rodriguez, 174 P.3d at 1103. 
 173 Id. at 1103–05. 
 174 Id. at 1106. 
 175 Id. at 1105–06. 
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sponsibility, which the court concluded involved a serious abuse of 
trust).
176
 
Even this case is not as extreme as G.G.’s two kisses.  Rodriguez 
presents the special problem of sexual conduct in the context of an 
adult-child relationship, even if the sexual roles are reversed from the 
more stereotypical situation of an older male offender and a young 
female victim.  Further, although not explicit in the court’s opinion, 
a full reading of the opinion suggests that the judges assumed that 
the defendant and the victim had engaged in much more inappro-
priate conduct, probably sexual intercourse.
177
  Thus, this is not a case 
in which a brief caress, without more, gave rise to criminal liability. 
C. Punishment Under State Sexual Assault Law 
Before discussing the normative question, whether the Italian 
approach is sound, one must address what kind of punishment G.G. 
or A.M. might face if convicted of sex offenses under American law. 
In Alabama, sexual abuse is a Class C felony
178
 with a penalty of 
imprisonment for not less than one year and one day and not more 
than ten years.
179
  A sex offender is required to register for the crime 
of sexual abuse and is limited with whom he or she can live.
180
 A per-
son convicted of certain offenses, including sexual battery, must reg-
ister with the sheriff in the county of his or her residence and re-
register if he or she moves to another county.
181
  Further, unlike some 
more draconian state laws, the Alabama registry of sex offenders is 
open only to law enforcement officers and agencies.
182
 
In California, the punishment for misdemeanor sexual battery 
may not exceed two thousand dollars or six months in county jail, 
with higher penalties if the offender was the victim’s employer.183  
The California Penal Code requires the registration of every person 
convicted of specified felony sex offenses, as well as other offenses de-
 
 176 Id. at 1106. 
 177 See id. at 1101 (“Defendant took the victim with her on several trips to Bend 
and Spokane, [including two] overnight trips.  The two were frequently alone to-
gether in her car, at her apartment, and at his home.  They were seen alone together 
in her office at the club with the door closed.”). 
 178 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.).  
 179 Id.§ 13A-5-6(a)(3). 
 180 Id.§ 13A-11-204(b). 
 181 Id.§ 13A-11-200. 
 182 Id.§ 13A-11-202. 
 183 CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation). 
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fined in the code.
184
  In California, offenders who commit sexual bat-
tery or child sexual abuse are subject to registration requirements.
185
  
The offender must register as long as the offender lives in Califor-
nia.
186
  The offender must register with the chief of police of the city 
“within five working days of coming into, or changing . . . residence” 
or location within the city.
187
  The offender must register annually, 
within five working days of his or her birthday, to update his or her 
registration, providing his or her name, address, temporary location, 
and place of employment including the name and address of the 
employer.188  Even more recently, as the result of an ill-conceived bal-
lot initiative,
189
 California has added a requirement that an offender 
convicted of a “registerable sex offense”190 must submit to GPS moni-
toring for any term of parole.
191
  Further, California’s Department of 
Justice maintains a publicly accessible Web site that provides exten-
sive data about each registrant.
192
 
If these acts qualify as sexual battery in Indiana, the punishment 
would be imprisonment from six months to three years, with the advi-
sory sentence being one and one-half years.
193
  But Indiana has the 
least onerous registration requirement, applicable only if the person 
is convicted of child molestation under Indiana Code section 35-42-4-
3.
194
 
In New Jersey, a person convicted of sexual assault is also subject 
to registration.
195
  The registrant may file a motion to be removed 
 
 184 22 WEST’S CAL. JUR. 3D § 44 (2009).  
 185 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (describing registration requirements for persons 
convicted of sexual abuse under section 243.4 and for persons convicted under sec-
tion 288 of lewd and lascivious behavior with a child under the age of fourteen). 
 186 WEST’S CAL. JUR. 3D, supra note 184. 
 187 Id. 
 188 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290, 290.012, 290.015. 
 189 Bill Ainsworth, Law to Boost Sex Offender Monitoring Falling Short, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 14, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/ 
uniontrib/20080214/news_1n14jessica.html. 
 190 A “registerable sex offense” is one that requires registration under California 
Penal Code section 290(c). CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000.07 (West, Westlaw through 2009 
legislation). 
 191 Id. § 3000.07(a). 
 192 Id. § 290.4; see also Vitiello, supra note 87, at 668–74 (providing a detailed dis-
cussion of the various registration requirements under California law). 
 193 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-7 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation).  In Indi-
ana sexual battery is a Class D felony barring aggravated circumstances.  Id. § 35-42-4-
8(a). 
 194 Id. § 35-42-4-11. 
 195 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-2 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008). 
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from the New Jersey State Registry if fifteen years have passed since 
the offender’s last offense.196 
The expansion of substantive sex offenses has occurred separate-
ly from the expansion of criminal penalties and other disabilities, like 
registration requirements.
197
  The former, as in Italy, was driven by 
feminist concerns about the insensitivity of the law to women’s 
plight.
198
  The expansion of penalties, by contrast, has been an over-
heated reaction to the infrequent abduction and murder of young 
children, with resulting penalties applying far beyond the pathologi-
cal sexual predator.
199
 
Thus, were G.G. or A.M. convicted in an American jurisdiction, 
they might be subject to a wide variety of punishments and other dis-
abilities, depending on the degree of the offense.  Certainly, as indi-
cated above, convicting A.M. is more plausible today than would be 
convicting G.G. 
IV. DO THE ITALIANS (OR THE AMERICANS) HAVE IT RIGHT?
200
 
Should A.M.’s201 and G.G.’s202 conduct be criminalized?  With re-
gard to A.M., I have considerable ambivalence but believe unequivo-
cally that G.G.’s conduct should not be criminal. 
I should start with an admission and my first lesson as someone 
engaging in comparative law.  Despite over thirty years of legal scho-
larship, this is my first comparative law article.  My first lesson is no 
doubt obvious to any comparativist: comparing specific cases is unin-
formed unless one looks at the larger context—here, at the entire 
justice system.  For example, as I develop below, much of my hesita-
tion about criminalizing both A.M. and G.G. derives from analyzing 
both punishment of sex offenders in the United States and alterna-
tive remedies, including civil suits and workplace regulations, to deal 
effectively with unwanted sexual behavior. 
As indicated above, broadly worded sexual assault statutes might 
encompass A.M.’s behavior.203  But finding analogous cases is prob-
 
 196 Id. § 2C:7-2(f). 
 197 See Vitiello, supra note 87, at 651. 
 198 Id. at 655–58. 
 199 Id. at 674–85. 
 200 That is, according to Professor Vitiello, do the Italians or Americans have it 
right? 
 201 See supra Part II.B. 
 202 See supra Part II.A. 
 203 See supra notes 130–139 and accompanying text. 
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lematic.  The two closest cases, both from Indiana, Bailey v. State
204
 and 
Scott-Gordon v. State,205 suggest some of the legal issues that a prosecu-
tor might face in a case like A.M.’s.  Not all jurisdictions have an of-
fense as broadly defined as California’s misdemeanor sexual battery, 
which criminalizes any unwanted sexual touching.
206
  Instead, many 
jurisdictions, like Indiana, require an element of force.
207
  In Scott-
Gordon,208 the Indiana Supreme Court recognized that the simple act 
of slapping a person’s buttocks did not include a separate act of 
force.  In Bailey, an Indiana appellate court distinguished Scott-
Gordon.209  In a somewhat strained reading of the state statute, the ap-
pellate court found the “force” element satisfied because of prior 
contact between the victim and defendant that put him on notice 
that his conduct was against her will.
210
 
No doubt A.M.’s conduct would amount to battery and, in the 
jurisdictions that have it, something akin to California’s misdemea-
nor sexual battery offense.  But whether he should be guilty under 
statutes like those in Indiana,
211
 New Jersey,
212
 or Alabama
213
 is a much 
harder question.  The court in Bailey strained to find the force ele-
ment satisfied, although it did so in a case which featured a troubling 
set of facts: Bailey had accosted the victim on prior occasions, includ-
ing one in which the victim saw him masturbating.214  Nevertheless, 
extending liability for “forcible” assault, without any act of force 
beyond the force of the sexual act itself, violates traditional principles 
of statutory construction, especially in criminal cases, where Ameri-
can courts typically follow the principle of lenity.
215
  Such a strained 
reading of the statute, whereby the court borders on substituting its 
judgment for that of the legislature, also raises questions of separa-
tion of powers. 
 
 204 764 N.E.2d 728 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 205 579 N.E.2d 602 (Ind. 1991). 
 206 CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.4(e)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation). 
 207 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation). 
 208 Scott-Gordon, 579 N.E.2d at 604. 
 209 Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 731–32. 
 210 Id. at 732.  
 211 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-8 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation). 
 212 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-3 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008). 
 213 ALA. CODE § 13A-6-66 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.). 
 214 Bailey, 764 N.E.2d at 730. 
 215 See, e.g., United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347–48 (1971); see also Zachary 
Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 885 (2004) (stat-
ing that the rule of lenity “directs courts to construe statutory ambiguities in favor of 
criminal defendants”). 
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Statutory interpretation aside, the far harder question is whether 
A.M. should be considered a sexual offender.  Absent criminal liabili-
ty, an offender like A.M. might be subject to civil liability in the Unit-
ed States.  Thus, the victims might readily seek civil damages for bat-
tery, including punitive damages,
216
 thereby providing deterrence and 
punishment for the offender.  In addition, although such cases are 
few and far between, A.M. might be subject to criminal charges for 
simple battery.
217
 
My hesitation in extending sexual offender laws (beyond, per-
haps, misdemeanor sexual battery, like California’s law) is based on 
the extreme penalties and collateral consequences of a finding that a 
person is a sex offender.  While I recognize that A.M’s behavior is dis-
tinct from a traditional battery because it implicates his victims’ sex-
ual autonomy, I remain troubled by A.M.’s case.  The expansion of 
the law governing rape and related sex offenses, mainly a response to 
the feminist movement, took place largely independently of the 
movement to expand punishments for sex offenders.
218
  Punishments 
for sex offenders have been driven by gruesome cases that make 
headlines in the news, involving offenders with long histories as sex-
ual predators.
219
  But the resulting statutes apply broadly, often to of-
fenders who do not represent significant risks of continued miscon-
duct.
220
  Nonetheless, beyond being subject to long prison terms, 
these offenders may be subject to lifetime registration requirements, 
to having their personal information readily available to anyone who 
goes online to a state-sponsored Web site,
221
 and to restrictions on 
where they can live (for example, not within a specified distance from 
a school or playground).
222
 
Does the underlying conduct really deserve the kinds of pu-
nishments that are now provided in many state criminal codes?  I 
think not; they are excessive.
223
  If such sentences and other disabili-
 
 216 See, e.g., Fall, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 742; see also Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 31 
(1983) (demonstrating the ability to recover punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983).      
 217 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-2-1 (West, Westlaw through 2009 legislation). 
 218 See Vitiello, supra note 87, at 653–54. 
 219 Id. at 667. 
 220 Id. at 669–72. 
 221 Id. at 672. 
 222 Id.  
 223 Despite the Supreme Court of Georgia’s holding in Humphrey v. Wilson, 652 
S.E.2d 501, 510–11 (Ga. 2007), American courts seldom overturn criminal sentences 
as excessive.  Cf. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29–31 (2003) (upholding a sen-
tence of twenty-five years to life in prison for a third felony, a theft offense). 
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ties, like registration requirements, are beyond the offenders’ des-
serts, do they serve other penal purposes?  In many cases, they do not.  
Harsh penalties for sex offenders have been driven by statistically ab-
errational cases
224
 and apply to a wide range of sexual activity not pos-
ing similar grave risks of harm.
225
  Legislatures have enacted sex of-
fender punishments based on misperceptions of the nature of sex 
offenders and their likely recidivism rates.
226
  Neither adult nor tee-
nage sex offenders constitute wholly homogenous groups, and many 
do not suffer from sexual pathologies.
227
  Indeed, sex offenders are 
“relatively unlikely to commit future sexual offenses.”228  Further, re-
searchers have been able to identify factors that correlate with reci-
divism, making predictions about the need for incarceration more 
accurate.
229
  Placing some low-risk offenders in prison may even in-
crease the likelihood that they will re-offend.
230
 
 
 224 Cf. LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL 
ASSAULT 27 (1997), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/soo.pdf 
(“Since the latter half of the 1980’s, the percentage of all murders with known cir-
cumstances in which rape or other sex offenses have been identified by investigators 
as the principal circumstance underlying the murder has been declining from about 
2% of murders to less than 1%.”). 
 225 See, e.g., Humphrey, 652 S.E.2d at 502.  But for the court’s disposition of the 
case, Wilson, a seventeen-year-old male, would have spent ten years in prison and 
been subject to lifetime registration requirements for receiving consensual fellatio 
from a fifteen-year-old girl.  Id. at 502–03.  The underlying conduct—sex between 
underage individuals—is remarkably common in the United States.  See FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING 
52 (2004).  
 226 See ZIMRING supra note 225, at 28 (stating that “recent legislation and policy-
making” are partly based on the assumption that sex offenders specialize in sex of-
fenses, but that “[m]ost repeat criminals are generalists whose criminal histories 
comprise a variety of different types of offense[s]”); see also id. at 29 (“When serious 
sex offenders are compared with those who commit theft or violent crimes, the pre-
valence of a distinct pathology is greater among sex offenders, but there is neverthe-
less substantial heterogeneity in almost every category of severe sex crime.”). 
 227 Id. at 29.    
 228 See John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration, the 
Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 570–72 
(2006).  
 229 See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
2007) (“[A]ctuarial measures for predicting the risk of recidivism posed by individual 
offenders have become more powerful over time.”); R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Mor-
ton-Bourgon, The Characteristics of Persistent Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Recidiv-
ism Studies, 73 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1154, 1158–59 (2005) (discussing 
the “predictors” of sexual recidivism); Edward J. Latessa & Christopher Lowen-
kamp, What Works in Reducing Recidivism?, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 521, 532–33 
(2006) (discussing “[f]our major factors . . . significantly related to recidivism”); 
Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Increasing the Effectiveness of Correc-
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The prosecution of A.M. may have had special significance in It-
aly, where, at least consistent with the cultural stereotype, men fre-
quently got away with slapping women’s buttocks.231  Judges might 
have believed that an expansive interpretation of article 609-bis was 
justified to make a statement that Italy would no longer tolerate that 
kind of behavior.  In effect, the judges might have been motivated by 
a special need to deter a particular kind of offensive behavior.  If that 
speculation is correct, American courts would not have a similar mo-
tive to send a message about that particular kind of behavior that, 
while certainly present, is not epidemic among American men.232 
I am more certain that G.G.’s conduct should not be crimina-
lized.  As a simple matter of statutory construction, one can argue 
that G.G.’s conduct does come within some sexual offense laws.233  
Further, G.G. violated his victim’s autonomy by attempting to kiss her 
twice and attempting to move her head to view the beautiful vistas.  
But that hardly ends the inquiry.  The concerns that I raised above—
for example, the excessive penalties for sex offenders—are even more 
troubling in a case like G.G.’s than in one like A.M.’s.  My hesitation 
is that an unwanted kiss is likely to arise in too many ambiguous situa-
tions to leave the blundering male open to criminal prosecution.  
 
tional Programming Through the Risk Principle: Identifying Offenders for Residential Place-
ment, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 263, 270–71 (2005) (finding that an offender’s 
“risk score demonstrate[s] fair predictive validity” of reincarceration and that “reci-
divism rates increase substantially with each category of risk”); John Monahan, A Juri-
sprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 
VA. L. REV. 391, 406–08 (2006) (“Recent research . . . indicates that the predictive va-
lidity of actuarial [or statistical] instruments has significantly improved in the past 
twenty years. . . . In the past several years . . . a number of violence risk assessment 
tools have become available . . . .”); Robert A. Prentky et al., Introduction, 989 ANNALS 
N.Y. ACAD. SCI. ix, xi (2003) (“[T]here has been a dramatic increase in the develop-
ment, validation, and revision of risk assessment procedures during the past dec-
ade.”); Stinneford, supra note 228, at 570–72 (2006) (discussing the factors asso-
ciated with increased risk of reoffending based on the findings of studies involving 
nearly 60,000 sex offenders). 
 230 See, e.g., Lowenkamp & Latessa, supra note 229, at 283–84 (finding “substantial” 
increases in recidivism rates for low and moderate risk offenders admitted into resi-
dential treatment programs and discussing the “importance of studying the different 
effects of programs [on] distinct groups of offenders”). 
 231 See generally Ella Ide, Charm of Italian Men is Lust in Translation, TELEGRAPH 
(London), Feb. 14, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/global/ 
main.jhtml?xml=/global/2008/02/14/exlustitalia.xml. 
 232 Lisa Litterio, Beware of the Natives in Italy, THE CRUSADER (College of the Holy 
Cross), Nov. 5, 2004, at A1, available at http://media.www.thehccrusader.com/ 
media/storage/paper568/news/2004/11/05/Features/Beware.Of.The.Natives.In. 
Italy-795900.shtml (discussing the more socially aggressive nature of Italian men as 
compared to American men).  
 233 See supra Part IV. 
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Thus, G.G. may have believed that his victim was interested in him.  
While his victim had to make her lack of consent clear twice, G.G.’s 
clumsy attempts seem to have ended once his second kiss was re-
buffed, suggesting that he got the point, if belatedly. 
Of course, G.G. may have had a mens rea defense; that could be 
sufficient to protect him as being a fool, rather than a sex offender.  
Mens rea defenses, at least in the United States, are a bit tricky: in 
rape cases, where states allow a mistake-of-fact defense, it remains an 
affirmative defense, with the burden on the offender to prove that his 
mistake was reasonable.234  That means that a sex offender may be 
found guilty based on a civil negligence standard without subjective 
awareness of his mistake or without having taken a higher degree of 
risk than the level needed for civil liability.
235
  At the end of the day, I 
remain convinced that a kiss is just a kiss.
236
  We are at risk of over-
criminalizing so many aspects of our lives; at least, short of a strong 
need for social protection, we should leave kissing out of the purview 
of the criminal law even if it comes within the literal language of 
broadly drafted sex offender statutes. 
V. TWO NOTEWORTHY AMERICAN CASES 
Sexual mores have changed dramatically in the United States 
since the 1950s.  A majority of teenagers under the age of legal con-
sent are sexually active.
237
  Despite that, some prosecutors have shown 
an increased interest in pursuing statutory rape cases in recent 
years.
238
  One commentator explains this continued interest in crimi-
nal prosecutions as a product of concern about the high number of 
teen pregnancies.
239
  Others justify the increased use of the criminal 
law in sex cases involving minors by reference to concern about the 
 
 234 See infra notes 268–272 and accompanying text.  
 235 Commonwealth v. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224, 233 (Mass. 1982) (“[D]efense of 
mistake of fact [for the crime of rape] requires that the accused act in good faith and 
with reasonableness.”).  
 236 I have no doubt that a creative law professor might come up with a bizarre ex-
ample of a person who dashes about kissing his victims, fully aware that his victims do 
not want him to kiss them.  Apart from the infrequency of such conduct, I suspect 
that even without a specific sex offense, traditional crimes like simple battery can 
provide sufficient protection.   
 237 ZIMRING, supra note 225, at 52–53. 
 238 Rigel Oliveri, Statutory Rape Law and Enforcement in the Wake of Welfare Reform, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 463, 475 (2000).  
 239 Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Sta-
tutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 703, 706 (2000). 
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potential abuse of minors at the hands of adults.
240
  Neither of those 
concerns explains the first noteworthy case that made headlines in 
the United States. 
A. Genarlow Wilson 
Seventeen-year-old Genarlow Wilson was one of a number of 
teenagers who rented adjoining motel rooms for an unsupervised 
New Year’s Eve party.241  During the course of the evening, Wilson was 
videotaped engaging in two sex acts.
242
  The videotape showed him 
engaging in intercourse with one girl and an act of fellatio with 
another girl.
243
  Both girls were under the age of consent, resulting in 
one charge of rape and one count of aggravated child molestation.
244
  
At trial, Wilson was acquitted of rape but found guilty of the molesta-
tion charge, resulting in a mandatory sentence of ten years in prison 
without the possibility of parole.
245
 
Wilson argued on appeal that the ten-year prison term violated 
equal protection.
246
  Specifically, under Georgia law, a seventeen-year-
old who engages in intercourse with a female minor over the age of 
fourteen would be guilty of a misdemeanor.
247
  By comparison, a se-
venteen-year-old who engages in an act of sodomy with a minor is 
guilty of a felony, subject to the mandatory minimum sentence.
248
  
The Georgia appellate court rejected this argument.
249
 
Wilson subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition in state court, 
which found that the sentence constituted cruel and unusual pu-
nishment.
250
  The state supreme court affirmed the trial court’s find-
ing that the sentence was grossly disproportionate under both the 
 
 240  MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3 cmt. 3 & n.4 (1980). 
 241 Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). 
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
 246 Id. at 392–3. 
 247 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3(b) (West, Westlaw through 2009); Wilson, 631 S.E.2d at 
392–93.   
 248 Wilson, 631 S.E.2d at 392.  The Georgia legislature has amended that provision, 
making the seventeen-year-old offender’s conduct a misdemeanor today.  See GA. 
CODE ANN. § 16-6-4 (West, Westlaw through 2009); H.B. 123, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Ga. 2009) (enacted).  
 249 Wilson, 631 S.E.2d at 393. 
 250 Humphrey v. Wilson,  652 S.E.2d 501, 502 (Ga. 2007). 
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Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Geor-
gia Constitution.
251
 
Beyond the scope of this Article is whether the holding was con-
sistent with the precedent of the Supreme Court of the United 
States.
252
  Suffice it to say that many observers undoubtedly were re-
lieved that the court intervened and ordered the release of a young 
man whose behavior seemed foolhardy but hardly the kind of serious 
criminal conduct that should send him to prison for ten years.
253
  For 
purposes of this Article, the case shows the long prison sentences 
meted out to some sexual offenders.
254
 
B. Kobe Bryant 
The second headline case involves National Basketball Associa-
tion superstar Kobe Bryant, perhaps of special interest to an Italian 
audience because he grew up in Italy, where his father, also a former 
NBA player, resumed his career playing for several Italian teams.255 
In 2003, the state of Colorado filed a criminal complaint alleging 
that Kobe Bryant committed forcible sexual penetration of a woman 
against her will.
256
  The episode took place in Bryant’s hotel room.257  
After a nineteen-year-old hotel employee gave Bryant a tour of the 
hotel, they went to his room where they engaged in intercourse.
258
 
The case drew national attention, but never went to trial.
259
  
Prosecutors dropped the charges, in part because the young woman 
 
 251 Id. at 505. 
 252 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding a sentence of twen-
ty-five years to life in prison for a third felony, a theft offense). 
 253 Brenda Goodman, Man Convicted as Teenager in Sex Case Is Ordered Freed by Geor-
gia Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at A9. 
 254 Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003) found a constitutional right to privacy sufficiently broad to encompass con-
sensual homosexual conduct, virtually all sexual acts between consenting adults are 
protected.  Notable exceptions are acts of incest and plural marriages.  By contrast, 
State v. Rodriguez, 174 P.3d 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), rev’d in part, 217 P.3d 659 (Or. 
2009) and Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) demonstrate severe pe-
nalties when one of the participants is a minor, even when the minor gives “factual” 
consent. 
 255 Wayne Coffey, Father Time: Kobe’ [sic] Dad an Ageless Wonder in ABA, NEW YORK 
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 16, 2005, at 106.  
 256 People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624, 627 (Colo. 2004). 
 257 Associated Press, Suit Settlement Ends Bryant Saga, MSNBC NEWS, Mar. 3, 2005, 
http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/7019659. 
 258 Kirk Johnson et al., As Accuser Balks, Prosecutors Drop Bryant Rape Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2004, at A1. 
 259 Id. 
220 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:191 
also brought civil charges.
260
  Her civil suit settled, without the terms 
of settlement being made public.
261
 
Accounts of the case suggest that it fits within a common fact 
pattern: the publicized version of the events suggests a situation in 
which the man mistakenly believed that the woman had consented to 
intercourse, partially due to her consent to some acts short of inter-
course.
262
  As Bryant later admitted publicly, he believed that the in-
tercourse was consensual but indicated that he “recognize[s] now 
that she did not and does not view this incident the same way I did.”263 
Had the case been tried, it would have presented one of the 
most important questions in current American rape law.  As rape law 
expanded during the 1970s and 1980s through the influence of fe-
minist groups, prosecutors began at least occasionally prosecuting 
cases of acquaintance rape.
264
  In such cases, guilt may turn on direct-
ly conflicting testimony as to the participants’ behavior; that is, the 
man may describe a completely different set of facts than the woman 
presents.
265
  But in some cases, even accepting the woman’s version of 
the facts, guilt or innocence may turn on whether a mistake of fact 
exists as to the presence of consent.
266
  And here, American jurisdic-
tions vary in their approaches to the legal question.
267
 
In theory, the law ought to follow the general rule governing 
mistakes of fact, now reflected in Model Penal Code section 2.04(a),
268
 
that a mistake of fact is relevant insofar as it negates the relevant 
mens rea of the offense.  The House of Lords took that approach in 
Regina v. Morgan.269  But American courts refused to follow Morgan.
270
  
Instead, American courts have followed one of two approaches to the 
 
 260 Id. 
 261 Associated Press, supra note 257.  
 262 Compare Interview by Dan Loya & Doug Winters with Kobe Bryant in Eagle 
County, Cal. (July 2003), available at http://www. thesmokinggun.com/archive/ 
0924041kobea1.html (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) (discussing Bryant’s perspective on 
the events) with Associated Press, Rape Case Against Bryant Dismissed, MSNBC NEWS, 
Sept. 2, 2004, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/5861379 (discussing victim’s perspective 
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 263 Tom Kenworthy & Patrick O’Driscoll, Judge Dismisses Bryant Rape Case, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 2, 2004 at 1A. 
 264 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sherry, 437 N.E.2d 224 (Mass. 1982). 
 265 See, e.g., id. at 227. 
 266 Id.  
 267 See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 51, at § 33.05 (describ-
ing different approaches of courts to mistake of fact situations). 
 268 MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.04(1)(a) (1985).  
 269 See generally [1976] A.C. 182 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.).   
 270 See, e.g., Sherry, 437 N.E.2d at 233. 
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question: Some have held that the defendant must prove that his mis-
take is reasonable,
271
 while others have held that if the woman initially 
says no, the defendant proceeds at his own risk.
272
 
The question is a difficult one.  To borrow a phrase from Cathe-
rine MacKinnon, if the man has a reasonable mistake defense, “a 
woman is raped but not by a rapist[.]”273 A woman’s sense of autono-
my may be equally violated whether the man knew that he was pro-
ceeding without her consent or not.  And yet, rape is graded a serious 
felony, often a crime of violence, with commensurate criminal penal-
ties and other disabilities—including, as discussed above, registration 
for life.
274
  Elsewhere, the debate over some subjective awareness of 
serious crimes is largely settled, absent some compelling policies to 
the contrary, and even where the criminal law abandons subjective 
mens rea, it requires more than mere negligence, the civil tort stan-
dard.
275
 
VI. HOW WOULD AN ITALIAN COURT TREAT WILSON AND BRYANT? 
Under Italian law, Wilson would certainly be acquitted.  The age 
of consent in Italy is fourteen and there are no exceptions related to 
the nature of the sexual acts committed.
276
 
A case like Kobe Bryant’s may be more debatable in its judicial 
outcome, even though Italian law, at least in theory, is quite clear in 
this respect. Under Italian criminal code, rape is no exception to the 
general rules regarding mens rea.
277
 This means that any mistake of 
fact on the part of the actor negates the relevant mens rea (dolo), in-
cluding, in principle, even an unreasonable mistake.  Of course 
things might be more questionable when it comes to trials and judi-
cial decisions.  If the defendant argues that he believed that the 
woman was consenting, the judge—there is no jury in Italian trials 
 
 271 See, e.g., People v. Stitely, 108 P.3d 182, 208 (Cal. 2005). 
 272 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simcock, 575 N.E.2d 1137, 1140 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1991). 
 273 Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Fe-
minist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 654 (1983). 
 274 See Vitiello, supra note 87, at 672. 
 275 See MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 (1985); DRESSLER, 
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 51, at 140– 42.  
 276 See C.P. art. 609-quater. 
 277 See C.P. art. 43.  For an example of case law on rape defining mens rea, see 
Cass. pen., sez. III, 30 mar. 2000, Rivista penale 2000, 687.  
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concerning rape
278—simply might not believe his allegations.  But if 
the judicial findings confirm the mistake alleged by the defendant, 
his defense will be successful.  Given the publicly available informa-
tion regarding Bryant’s case, he would likely be acquitted in an Ital-
ian court because of mistake of fact.  
VII. DO THE ITALIANS (OR THE AMERICANS) HAVE IT RIGHT?
279
 
Turning to more general points, both Italian and American laws 
on sexual offenses show some relevant defects.  Italian law, from 1996 
on, contains one single offense of rape.
280
  This means that all kinds 
of acts of a sexual nature give rise to the same single offense of rape.  
A simple kiss on the cheek and the most heinous form of violent sex-
ual penetration will lead to a conviction for the same sexual of-
fense.281  The different amount of force is not even relevant, because 
rape can be committed by a sudden and fleeting slap on the buttock 
or by threatening the victim with a knife.
282
 
The lack of variety of sexual offenses under Italian law creates 
confusion and unfair judicial outcomes.  Italian courts do not want to 
leave Italian sex offenders unpunished and their victims unprotected, 
and they tend to convict in cases that fall short of what most consider 
rape.  This explains why cases such as G.G. and A.M. find such sur-
prising decisions in court.  Italian law should develop a more struc-
tured system of sexual offenses, categorizing them from the most le-
nient to the most serious ones.  With such a framework in place, 
Italian courts would certainly come to more understandable deci-
sions. 
With regard to American law, I agree with Professor Vitiello.  On 
the one hand, some of the offenses seem to be too harshly drafted, 
such as seen in Professor Vitiello’s discussion of Georgia law above;283 
 
 278 See CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] arts. 5–6 (Italy); Law No. 287 of 10 
apr. 1951, art. 3, Gazz. Uff. No. 102, 7 may 1951 (Italy); Royal Decree No. 12 of 30 
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on the other hand, general principles such as mens rea should not be 
altered in the context of rape, because such exceptions can lead to 
discrimination among various types of offenders.  Of course, there is 
room for minor offenses where the actus reus or the mens rea is less 
serious; such offenses could provide for criminal negligence as the 
minimum subjective element. 
But the consequences of sexual offenses in American law—as 
Professor Vitiello has demonstrated elsewhere and here as well—are 
very harsh, and they apply normally both to serious and less serious 
sexual offenses. 
I personally agree that victims of sexual crimes must be pro-
tected by the criminal justice system; thus, I agree with some provi-
sions, such as the registration of sexual offenders. But such measures 
should only apply to the most serious cases and to the most vicious 
offenders, especially to offenders with a high risk of recidivism. 
With these specifications, Italian law should provide for some 
more effective measures in order to reduce the rate of recidivism in 
these matters. The Italian legislature is now discussing introducing 
some form of “chemical castration,” which should be applied only in 
particular cases and with the consent of the offender.284 
The criminal law should be tailored to reflect criminal behav-
iors, and criminal sanctions and measures should be fair and propor-
tional to the crime and to the need of society.  When laws depart 
from such a rule, they create injustice and lead citizens to lose confi-
dence in the criminal justice system as a whole.  
 
 284 See Modifiche al codice penale e altre disposizioni per la lotta contro la 
pedofilia, S. 458, XVI Leg., arts. 6–7 (2008) (Italy).  
